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reciprocity, is analysed. The basic premise is that gratuitousness is a feature
acquired by an action by virtue of the intentions that inspire the action itself.
In this respect, the search for gratuitousness may require to discriminate
among aestetically equivalent actions on the basis of the psychological
disposition of the actor. The main claim of the paper is that in economically
relevant situations gratuituousness is to be conceived as a modality of
cooperation, emerging as the outcome of a team reasoning perspective and
motivating such a perspective without any need for reciprocity. This claim is
analysed with regard to blood donations and, more generally, with regard to
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1 Introduction
The essence of a market economy is that something has to be given up to get something
back in exchange. Under appropriate conditions, a satisfactory degree of coordination
among traders and some efficiency in the allocation of societal resources may emerge.
Copyright © 2015 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.
On the economic relevance of the principle of gratuitousness 205
In the respectable perspective starting with the marginal revolution, interaction
among traders come about prevalently – if not exclusively – through the market. In such
perspective social interaction is necessarily characterised by reciprocity only. It is fair
to say, however, that besides reciprocity other principles motivate human action.
In this short essay, I analyse the principle of gratuitousness and its relationships
with other principles motivating behaviour. As I shall emphasise, the most distinctive
feature of any action inspired by gratuitousness is that the benefits it may generate
for the performer are an unintentional consequence of the action itself. In this
respect, gratuitousness is nothing but a feature of a given action by virtue of the
intentions that inspire the action itself. Therefore, the search for gratuitousness may
require to discriminate among aestetically equivalent actions on the basis of the
psychological disposition of the actor1: a gift may be instrumental to achieve a given
goal (something that can be judged as particularly reprehensible) or it may be the
expression of gratuitousness; individuals may understand the intentions behind a given
act, conditioning their behaviour to such intentions.
Practices of gift-giving are popularly interpreted as typical instances of
gratuitousness. However, as far as gift-giving is concerned, economists have generally
accepted the conclusion of anthropologist Mauss (1925) that such practices are basically
motivated by the expectation of reciprocity and play an important role in improving
the allocation of resources in markets characterised by informational asymmetries,
e.g., Schotter (1979) and Akerlof (1982). The gift-giving as agapic love paradigm2 has
not gained much popularity among economists, despite the evidence that gift-giving can
also qualify as an expression of gratuitousness. This is why, in this article, I do not use
the words gratuitousness and gift as synonyms. Rather I conceive gratuitousness in very
general terms, as a feature that a given action, hence also gift-giving, may possess or
not.
A preliminary issue to tackle before proceeding any further is why economists
should be interested in gratuitousness.
In a positive perspective, neglecting gratuitousness means neglecting a force that,
besides self-love, provides adequate motivation to economically relevant action and
therefore contributes to the allocation of societal resources. Until now economists
have simply focused on what they believed to be instances of gratuitousness, such
as tipping for example (Schotter, 1979). Gratuitousness is however a much more
crucial force than what the analysis of tipping suggests (Arrow, 1972). Grounded in
a team reasoning perspective and possibly motivating it, gratuitousness is crucial in
explaining some puzzles in individuals’ behaviour, such as the voluntary contribution
to public goods or charitable ventures, that standard theories of reciprocity, based
on individually instrumental rationality, do not explain satisfactorily. In a normative
perspective, reflection on gratuitousness might positively contribute to the discussion
on what makes a society really prosperous; on what contributes to make a society a
flourishing network of relationships.
The article is organised as follows. In Section 2, a general framework for the analysis
of reciprocity will be introduced. This framework will prove useful both to define
gratuitousness and to understand its nexus with reciprocity. In Section 3, a definition
of gratuitousness will be given. Basically gratuitousness will be conceived as a feature
acquired by a given action by virtue of the intentions that inspire the action itself. The
basic claim of the paper, i.e., that in economically relevant situations gratuitousness is
to be conceived as a modality of cooperation, possibly emerging as the outcome of a
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team reasoning perspective and motivating it without any need for reciprocity, will be
discussed in Section 4, with regard to blood donations and voluntary contributions to
the provision of goods generating public benefits. Section 5 concludes.
2 Reciprocity: an evolutionary framework
In this section, I briefly illustrate the framework usually employed to analyse reciprocity.
The analysis that follows is based on it.
2.1 Basic assumptions
I consider an evolutionary setting populated by a set I  f1; : : : ; i; : : : ng of individuals
with the option of helping one another. I suppose that at any time t 2 N , g random
pairs of individuals are chosen, one as a potential donor of some altruistic act, the other
as a potential recipient. I denote by Dt and Rt the set of donors and recipients at t
respectively, with typical elements k 2 Dt and j 2 Rt. As it is common, I also suppose
that the altruistic act implies a cost c to the donor, but confers a benefit b to the recipient,
(b > c). Refusing help implies zero payoffs both for the donor and the recipient. When
an individual is selected as a donor at t, she must perform an action ait 2 fH;NHg,
where H stands for help (cooperation) and NH for not help (defection).
As shown in Figure 1, assuming that both players may act simultaneously as donor
of each other, the interaction displays the structure of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game, where
 d is the loss of being chated.
Figure 1 Payoff matrix for social dilemma games
H NH
H (b  c; b  c) ( d; b)
NH (b; d) (0; 0)
b > d > c > 0
Whenever it is assumed that all the individuals have the opportunity of donating, at any
t, either in favour of a randomly chosen j, or in favour of the community, the game
exhibits the structure of the mutual-aid game (Sugden, 1986) or the public good game
(e.g., Bowles and Gintis, 2010) respectively.
Models of direct reciprocity assume that the individual who is affected by akt has the
chance of reciprocating at t+m, m > 0, possibly rewarding pro-social behaviour with
help and punishing selfishness by not providing help. In models of indirect reciprocity
it is assumed that reciprocation is carried on by a third party.
In both types of models it is then assumed that an agent h who may (direct
reciprocity) or may not (indirect reciprocity) correspond to the individual who is affected
by akt, observes the recipient’s status, which depends both on the recipient’s past
choices and on the rules   governing the evolution of status within the community,
and makes her decision relative to providing help or not contingent on such status
(taking into account that her decision will affect her own status according to  ). In
models of both direct and indirect reciprocity, a strategy is then a rule contingent on the
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status of the recipient, i.e., a rule of the following type k : t ! akt 2 fC;Dg, where
t = [1t; : : : ; nt] is the current status profile.
2.2 Conventions of reciprocity
In evolutionary environments the set of available strategies is not fixed. New strategies
continuously emerge (either because of random mutations occuring in the genome of
the individual organisms, or because the individuals experiment new behaviour) and are
selected according to material payoffs.
Despite the differences existing with non-evolutionary environments, any
equilibrium must still possess the Nash equilibrium properties. Therefore an equilibrium
is still a set fi g of strategies, one for each individual, such that no one would have
any incentive to deviate from the prescribed behaviour3.
As in evolutionary settings a huge amount of diversity is produced, it is required
that an equilibrium behaviour be somewhat resistant against invasion. The notion of
evolutionary stability can be seen as a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept
that takes this need into account. It requires that individuals belonging to a small
group playing a new strategy will do worse than the incumbents if they try to
enter a population4. The notion of evolutionary stability can be associated with the
notion of convention. A convention can indeed be thought as corresponding to one
evolutionarily stable strategy in a context in which there are at least two different
strategies (i.e., behaviour) enjoying such property (Sugden, 1986).
Both the rules governing the evolution of the status within the community and the
way individuals make their behaviour contingent on such status are of a conventional
nature. Thus they can be conceived as evolutionarily stable strategies, i.e., conventions.
Conventions of reciprocity can evolve and sustain an acceptable level of cooperation
(Trivers, 1971; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Sugden, 1986; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998;
Bowles and Gintis, 2011).
It is important to notice that cooperation does not evolve because the individuals are
aware that it is in their interest to be cooperative. The motivation behind cooperation
needs not be personal interest. What standard analysis indeed shows is that cooperative
individuals are not necessarily at a disadvantage, for their behaviour is rewarded by
virtue of (some form of) reciprocity (Nowak, 2006). Selection pressure do not work
against cooperators then (a belief that constituted a puzzle for Darwin himself), but may
favour them.
Indeed, it is easy to show how a too strict reading of reciprocity-based cooperation
would be fairly naive: suppose j falls into a river and k has the opportunity of providing
help; does k provide help because she expect that on future occasions either j herself or
a third party h will provide help to her by virtue of reciprocity? It seems more realistic
to suppose that help is given in exchange of a generalised obligation of reciprocity
on the part of “fellow men to help in other circumstances if needed” (Arrow, 1972).
However, the statement that individuals may act providing help on the expectation of
a generalised obligation of reciprocity on the part of fellow men is problematic from
an evolutionary perspective, for it implies for every one a generalised obligation of
providing help, even to strangers. Indeed, in their attempt to find out how a cooperative
behaviour could have started in the first place, i.e., how cooperation can evolve in
a world of defectors, Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) referred either to the hypothesis
that cooperation first evolved thanks to the close relatedness of interactants (kinship),
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which in their words solely permits pure altruism, or to the hypothesis of clustering.
In both cases the presumption is that individuals cooperate only if any of them deems
the opponent sufficiently close to her along a given dimension. It is a puzzle to be
explained then how a generalised obligation of reciprocity may emerge and persist in
an evolutionary environment.
3 Gratuitousness and intentions
In this section, a definition of gratuitousness is offered. Basically gratuitousness will
be conceived as a trait of a given action. Such a trait characterises the action because
of the intentions that inspire the action itself. As far as the problem of cooperation is
concerned, gratuitousness can also be conceived as a modality of cooperation in a sense
specified later.
Definition 1 (Gratuitousness): An action a performed by individual k is characterised by
gratuitousness if: it is costly to k; it provides benefits  to j in circumstances X; k is
aware of this; the benefits 0 that k may receive in circumstances Y as a consequence
of providing benefits  to j in circumstances X , are an unintentional consequence of
action a.
Let me discuss such definition. First, it posits that an action a performed by k is
characterised by gratuitousness (or it is an act of gratuitousness) if it provides benefits to
j in circumstances X . It is not required that such benefits come about as an immediate
consequence of the action. All that is required is that in circumstances X , j would have
not obtained  had a not been performed by k. Circumstances X can therefore be far in
time from the moment in which a is performed; furthermore it can be uncertain whether
circumstances X will come about. In other words, it might be uncertain whether and
when circumstances X will get established (incertus an, incertus quando).
Even if it is uncertain whether circumstances X will come about and when, k must
be aware that her action will provide benefits  to j in such circumstances. This is
important, for intentionality matters for gratuitousness. Let us suppose that walking
down the street where she lives, a paper sticks to k’s shoes and that she takes it off and
puts it into a bin without pursuing any other aim that making her shoes free from the
paper. This is an act providing benefits to any other j also living there. However this is
not an act characterised by gratuitousness, according to the definition given above, for
gratuitousness requires that k intentionally provides benefits  to j in circumstances X .
In this example, intentionality requires that in cleaning up the street where she lives, k
is being motivated by the will of providing benefits  (a clean road) to, for example,
any individual j who decides to walk down that street (circumstances X).
The benefits that k directly obtains from her own action do not necessarily
exclude gratuitousness. This is instead excluded if benefits to the others are provided
unintentionally and the action qualifies as a form of mutualism, i.e., apparently unselfish
behaviour, underpinning much of the observed cooperation in animal societies5.
Indeed, the third condition requires that benefits 0 obtained by k for performing a
must be an unintentional consequence of her action. Action a in other words must not
be instrumental to achieve benefits 0 in circumstances Y .
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It is important to notice that, according to the definition given above, the action
needs to be costly to k. This helps to discriminate between what is given by virtue of
gratuitousness and what is given for free because has no value whatsoever (Bruni, 2008).
To conclude this section, notice only that an act of gratuitousness might be an act
which is individually instrumental, but only unawarely so. This seems to be an oxymor,
but it is not. To see this, go back to the framework introduced in Section 2 above,
and suppose that in circumstances X , k plays the game as a donor, whereas j plays it
as a recipient. If k provides help because she expects that either j or a third party h
will reward her in the future, her action a is not characterised by gratuitousness in the
sense specified above. This however does not exclude that although the act is inspired
by the principle of gratuitousness, it provides benefits to k, even though k did not aim
to reap such benefits in making her choices. Whether or not k’s cooperative behaviour
is inspired by gratuitousness in many cases cannot be easily understood, for the action
that k takes might be aesthetically equivalent to the one k would take if she decided to
provide help for entirely instrumental reason.
4 Blood donations, voluntary contributions to the lifeboat service and the like
The problem of blood donations can be usefully interpreted using the framework
introduced in Section 2 above. At time t, any individual selected as a donor has to decide
whether to provide help (donate) or not. Assuming that donations confer no benefits
to the donor (which is plausible in large populations), entail a cost to her and are the
result of a decision taken by the donor as if she had the whole community as opponent,
the blood donation game has the same payoff structure of the PD game described in
Figure 1. In this game any individual has an obvious best strategy dictating to defect at
any t.
The blood donation game shares the same characteristics of the lifeboat service game
(Sugden, 1993) or of any strategic choice situation involving voluntary contribution to
public goods6.
Theories of (individually) instrumental rationality are very pessimistic about the
outcome of such games; the classical prediction is that individuals would not voluntarily
contribute, unless incentives of some sort are given, i.e., unless the payoff structure of
the game changes. There are reasons to argue that such pessimism may depend on the
fact that theories of (individually) instrumental reasoning commonly neglect a crucial
aspect of choice, which is related to how the individuals understand the game itself.
The most obvious interpretation for this is that individuals may plausibly frame a game
either as a problem for me or as a problem for us, e.g., Sugden (1993, 2003, 2011),
Tuomela (1995), Hollis (1998) and Bacharach (1999, 2006).
Grounding on this intution, in this section I try to answer to the following question:
can blood donations (or other acts involving voluntary contribution) be considered as
acts inspired by the principle of gratuitousness?
To answer this question let us go back to the definition of gratuitousness given
in Section 3 above. A blood donation is costly to k; it provides benefits  to j
in circumstances X; k is aware of this. In large population, where donations are
anonymous, the benefits 0 that k may receive in circumstances Y are an unintentional
consequence of her donation. Indeed, as in such populations there does not exist any
privilege for individuals who perform a blood donation to be served first should they
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have a need for blood, no one can realistically believe that the benefits individuals may
get in circumstances Y are a more or less direct consequence of their donations. The
only benefit that k might indeed receive would be to increase the probability of getting
a blood transfusion (benefits 0 ) should she have a need for that (circumstances Y ).
As this is clearly negligible, the donation cannot be conceived as instrumental and
the motivation behind this practice cannot be seen as underpinned by some form of
reciprocity.
Why do individuals donate then?
In a very famous article, Arrow (1972) casts many doubts on Titmuss’ (1971)
analysis of gifts relationships. He expecially critizises Titmuss’ claim that the creation of
a market for blood negatively affects blood donations. At the hearth of Titmuss’ (1971)
perspective there is the belief that blood donations contribute in shaping valuable social
relationships among the members of a given society, as witnessed by the following
passage quoted by Arrow himself:
“In not asking for or expecting any payment of money, these donors signify their
belief in the willingness of other men to act altruistically in the future, and to
combine together to make a gift freely available should they have a need for it.”
(p.239)
There are some aspects of this quotation which are worth considering. First, on Titmuss
account, blood donators display confidence in the fact that others will behave in the
same manner. So blood donators have an expectation based on trust. This expectation
is not, however, such as to make one’s own behaviour conditional to others’. Any
donor does not wait for the others to move first. Nor it is said that a donor would stop
contributing whenever she does not observe that other men act altruistically. Second, a
blood donator acts as if she followed a concerted plan, doing her part in a cooperative
enterprise whose aim is to make a good freely available, so that everyone can have
access to it whenever in need.
Drawing from it all the logical consequences, Titmuss’ perspective looks
extraordinarily close to the one taken by theories of Team agency which focus on modes
of reasoning used by individuals who identify with a group. In what follows I rely
on Gold and Sugden (2007) – who have represented team reasoning explicitly, as a
distinctive mode of behaviour – to catch the main intuitions behind Titmuss’ view. Then
I try to tackle the problem of gratuitousness within a schema of practical reasoning
grounded in a frame of we-rationality.
4.1 Team-reasoning
Following Gold and Sugden (2007), I consider a (weak) subset of I , G, with typical
element i. I denote by A  faitg8i2G the action profile at t, and by U : A! < a payoff
function assigning a numerical value to any action profile. I define common knowledge
as it is usually done: a proposition p is common knowledge in G if:
1 p is true
2 any i 2 G knows p
3 for any i; h 2 G, i knows that h knows p
4 for any i; h; z 2 G, i knows that h knows that z knows p; and so on.
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In their work, Gold and Sugden (2007) provide schemata exemplifying principles of
practical reasoning, i.e., reasoning that leads to conclusions about what an agent should
do, inferred from premises that the agent believes to be true and using a rule of inference
that she believes to be valid7. Here is a schema deriving a principle of practical reason
(what they call simple team reasoning) starting from premises which identify the group
as the unit of agency.
Schema 1. Simple team reasoning (Gold and Sugden, 2007):
Suppose that the following propositions are common knowledge in a set G of individuals
with typical element i:
P1 (mutual recognition): any i 2 G conceives of G as a unit of agency,
i.e., any i 2 G identifies with G
P2 (common aim): any i 2 G wants to maximise the same payoff function U
P3 (selection of the best alternative): the payoff profile A^ uniquely maximises U .
[P1–P3] ! Any i should choose her component of A^.
Notice that, on this account, the expectation that any other individual in G cooperates
to combine together to make a gift freely available, to use Titmuss’ words, can well
be interpreted as a consequence of a team reasoning perspective. Indeed, it would be
simple to show that also the following proposition is a direct consequence of [P1–P3]:
P4 (mutual reassurance): any i 2 G expects any other h 2 G to choose her
component of A^.
Thus, on this account, whenever a team reasoning perspective is adopted by a set of
individuals, such individuals constitute a group whose internal ties are strenghetened
by the expectation of mutual cooperation. Notice that the conclusion inferred from
P1–P3 above dictates an individual to choose her component of A^ in situations where
rationality also suggests to any other member of G to do the same, and this is common
knowledge, as proposition P4 suggests. An expectation of reciprocity is therefore present
(at least in this version of team reasoning); indeed, any individual i 2 G performs her
part on the understanding that any other h 2 G will perform hers.
How does this can be conciled with the explanation of blood donations or other
voluntary contributions in which one’s actions are not necessarily conditional on
reciprocity?
My answer is that, although the motivation behind we-rationality is necessarily
unique (i.e., achieving something which is good for us), on practical grounds there are
different ways in which this motivation is translated into a concrete behavioural code,
which necessarily adapts to perceived changes in the strategic situation.
To better clarify this point, let me consider the strategic situation described by
the HI-LO game, e.g., Bacharach (2006). In this game, any player has to choose an
item from the same finite set of alternatives. To any alternative is associated a prize.
One alternative’s prize is greater than all the others. The rules of the game are such
that players get the same prize if they choose the same alternative, they get nothing
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otherwise. It is clear that in a game like HI-LO, any individual adopting team reasoning
must have an expectation of reciprocity.
Consider indeed a two-player HI-LO game. Suppose it is fHIGH;LOWg the
choice set and that the highest prize is associated with the outcome (HIGH, HIGH). If
i does not expect j to play HIGH, there is no point for i to play HIGH. Similarly, if i
does not expect j to play LOW, there is no point for i to play LOW. Individuals are in
the same situation in which the best-reply reasoning would place them. Only in the case
in which any of the players has a reasonable expectation that also the other considers as
the main dilemma, and is ready to do her part to promote, what is best for us, the two
options fHIGH;LOWg differ. A notion of reciprocity is in this case clearly involved.
In the case of voluntary contribution to the provision of goods generating public
benefits, a notion of reciprocity is not necessarily involved, for, I believe, coordination
among players is not strictly necessary to motivate behaviour.
In some situations, a group G  I , of individuals may coordinate their actions -
despite being aware that non-G individuals would not coordinate theirs’ with them -
conditional on there being a sufficient number  of individuals in the group to motivate
a team perspective. In some other situations an individual might be motivated by a team
perspective, acting as if the other individuals were motivated in the same way. I believe
this happens whenever one realises that her own contribution, taken in isolation, is a
worth activity 8.
Hollis (1998, p.147) brillantly clarifies the point:
“There is a logic of ‘enough’, I submit, which can overcome the dominance of
defection, provided that a sense of membership is in play. Donors cooperate if
confident that enough blood is being provided by enough members. Thus, public
goods which depend on creative altruism are a matter both of a large enough
total to secure the good and of enough contributors for mutual reassurance that
contributing is a worthy activity. Enough is then enough.”
To specify what I have in mind by means of a schema of practical reasoning, I suppose
that any individual in G aknowledges U as her objective, which is a milder requirement
than that presupposing that any individual in T wants to maximise U. I then show how
the behaviour generated by this schema of practical reasoning is consistent with the
principle of gratuitousness.
Schema 2. Normative team reasoning
Suppose the following propositions are group conditional common knowledge in a
subset of individuals G, ; 6= G  I  f1; : : : ; i; : : : ng, with typical element j:
P1T (mutual recognition): any j 2 G identifies with I
P2T (normative disposition and conditionality): any j 2 G aknowledges U as the
objective of I , conditional on jGj  j
P3T (critical mass requirement): for any j 2 G, jGj  j
P4T (selection of the best alternative): the action profile A^G uniquely maximises U ,
given the actions of non-members of G, i.e., A^I G.
[P1T–P4T] ! j should follow her component of A^G.
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There are three things worth noticing. First, the critical mass requirement jGj  j
can be such that j = 0. In my view this corresponds to situations in which an
individual believes that contributing is a worthy activity even if no other contributions
are provided. Contrary to Hollis, I think that one’s decision to donate blood is not
necessarily conditional on others doing the same, for this is really a case in which any
donation, singularly considered, is a worthy action. Second, any individual in G has
to be motivated by a normative disposition which induces her to aknowledge U as the
objective of I , on the grounds that U is best for us, where us is here a universe of
individuals larger than the one affiliated to G. Third, the notion of reciprocity involved
in this schema of practical reason – ‘cooperate whenever jGj  j’ – is not the usual
one. No member of G expects a benefit accruing to her by virtue of reciprocation.
In other words, differently from more standard theories, reciprocity does not reward
a cooperative disposition, even though it makes a cooperative disposition something
worthy.
I believe that it is this schema of practical reasons that stays behind any action
inspired by the principle of gratuitousness as I have defined it. In this respect,
gratuitousness, conceived as grounded in a team reasoning perspective and possibly
motivating it, is crucial in explaining apparently irrational behaviour, such as the
voluntary contribution to public goods or charitable ventures, whenever standard theories
of reciprocity, based on individually instrumental rationality, do not apply.
5 Concluding remarks
The fact that so little attention has been given to gratuitousness is not surprising,
given the persistence of a widespread cultural bias which neglects the role of purely
non-selfish motivations.
The discussion above should have made clear that some practices of gift-giving, such
as tipping for example, are not necessarily inspired by gratuitousness. This conclusion is
consistent, I believe, with the basic premise that gratuitousness is a feature acquired by
an action by virtue of the intentions that inspire the action itself. An act of gratuitousness
might be an act which is individually instrumental, but only unawarely so. In the sense
specified above, gratuitousness is a modality of cooperation emerging as the outcome
of a team reasoning perspective and motivating such a perspective without any need for
reciprocity. As far as the ability of assuming this perspective benefits the individuals
endowed with it – also by virtue of reciprocity - gratuitousness cannot be conceived as
irrational, an error in a world regulated by evolutionary forces.
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Notes
1 This is a job that human beings perform fairly well, as everyday experience and the
evidence collected so far show, e.g., Gallagher et al. (2002) and Singer and Tusche (2014).
2 Differently from the view that gift giving has to be solely interpreted as instrumental to
achieve a given goal, the agapic love paradigm valorises expressive altruistic gifts that
reveal and celebrate emotions, e.g., Belk and Coon (1993).
3 In formal terms, for any strategy available to i, 
0









 i), where Vi(i ;  i) is i’s payoff (fitness) when she plays i and
the strategy profile of her opponents is  i.
4 A strategy  is said to be evolutionarily stable, iff for any conceivable alternative strategy

0
, either Vi(; ) > Vi(
0
; ), or Vi(; ) = Vi(
0







5 Some apparently cooperative behaviours are forms of mutualism, in which any individual
maximises its own fitness and any effect on the fitness of others is coincidental,
e.g., Clutton-Brock (2009).
6 Clearly, this is not to say that blood has the characteristics of a public good in the standard
sense, but that the strategical structure of the game is that of a public good game. As for
the lifeboat service, in Britain it is entirely financed by voluntary contributions. Notice that,
from a theoretical perspective, contributions to charitable ventures also raise problems
similar to the ones discussed in this section.
7 For my purposes I can skip the problems related to the objective validity of both the
premises and the inference rule. On this, Sugden (2003).
8 This kind of Kantian perspective can be grounded in the principle of gratuitousness,
and is different from other self-interested perspectives grounded on apparently equal
principles, e.g., Laffont (1975).
